Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Fri Aug 14, 2020 10:17 pm
This actually looks like an RC model.
yep
yep
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UJ's Hamster Died. We're All That's Left...
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HomeBrew's Military thread
Page 21 of 59
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Fri Aug 14, 2020 10:18 pm
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Sat Aug 15, 2020 5:39 pm
Happy 75th anniversary VJ-Day. Man, 3/4 of a Century ago. Fading from memory fast.
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Wed Aug 19, 2020 4:58 pm
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Wed Aug 19, 2020 10:48 pm
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Thu Aug 20, 2020 12:36 am
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Thu Aug 20, 2020 7:21 pm
French Poilus of the 415th Infantry Regiment with their Hotckiss, 1915.
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Thu Aug 20, 2020 9:43 pm
Terrible camo, looks like they're going to a cocktail party. 19th century army heading into a 20th century war
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Thu Aug 27, 2020 11:10 am
Repairing the Bonhomme Richard Is Worth Almost Any Cost
The July fire on board the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) offers the Navy and the nation’s shipyards a valuable opportunity they have not had the since the end of World War II—the chance to repair a capital ship that has suffered catastrophic damage. As USNI News notes: “Between December 1941 and September 1945, over 350 U.S. Navy warships and patrol craft were sunk or damaged beyond repair. In the nearly seven decades since, fewer than 30 ships have been lost directly due to enemy action or accidents.”
The cost to repair the Bonhomme Richard will be high, coming on the back of its $249 million maintenance availability—perhaps even greater than the $3 billion dollar price tag to replace her with a new America-class LHA. There are many advocates making logical arguments that the extensive damage requires the Bonhomme Richard be decommissioned and struck from the Naval Vessel Register. Indeed, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Gilday has asked, “Should we make that investment in a 22-year-old ship? . . . I’m not going to make any predictions until we take a look at all the facts and we follow the facts and we can make reasonable recommendations up the chain of command on the future steps, any repair efforts, future repair efforts of Bonhomme Richard.” However, even in the current fiscal environment the Navy needs to look beyond the dollar cost as it decides the fate of the Bonhomme Richard.
If the United States goes to war with a peer adversary, some warships will suffer severe combat damage. Consider that it took nearly two years to repair the USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) and USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) following their 2017 collisions. In a fight with China for control of the Pacific, the United States will not have that long to get ships back in the fight. Taking years for repairs could cause the United States to lose the next war not long after the first major naval engagement. As unfortunate as the Bonhomme Richard fire was, the Navy now has an opportunity to relearn repairing severely damaged ships and getting them back into the fight.
“Damage to the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard caused by fires, explosions, and flooding is ‘extensive,” Gilday said in a summary report. “. . .We have not seen a fire of this magnitude on a Navy ship in recent memory, at least in my career.” Sailors and civilian contractors now will be able to develop and capture best practices on repairing catastrophically damaged ships. There will be setbacks—some ideas on how to best repair the ship will not work out, and costs will exceed original estimates, all while well-intentioned civilian bureaucrats and politicians question the Navy’s decision to repair rather than replace the ship. The Navy can overcome the setbacks and minimize the cost overruns while reinforcing a message that this is not just about repairing a damaged ship, it is about relearning the lost art of repairing battle-damaged ships. The nation that masters this first will have an advantage over its adversaries.
Repairing the Bonhomme Richard also will afford the Navy the chance to learn about the ship after it has been returned to service. For this reason, the Navy would be wise to embed civilian representatives from commercial shipyards, Naval Sea Systems Command, and any other commands that can learn from the Bonhomme Richard’s crew at sea following extensive repairs. Even in an ideal world after an extensive yard period, a ship’s systems will not always work as designed. The Bonhomme Richard will likely have numerous issues to resolve after being repaired.
Rather than thinking of the Bonhomme Richard as a badly damaged warship in need of scrapping or repair, she should be thought of as a floating test bed, laboratory, and schoolhouse in how to repair a badly damaged modern warship. Imagine if the Navy had possessed the institutional knowledge in ship repair on 7 December 1941 that it had on 2 September 1945. Having a robust ship-building industrial base ready for the demands of naval warfare is not just about being able to build new ships, it is also about being able to repair ships after they have been damaged in battle. It would be a tremendous mistake to miss this once-in-a-generation opportunity to learn how to do so.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedi ... t-any-cost
The July fire on board the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) offers the Navy and the nation’s shipyards a valuable opportunity they have not had the since the end of World War II—the chance to repair a capital ship that has suffered catastrophic damage. As USNI News notes: “Between December 1941 and September 1945, over 350 U.S. Navy warships and patrol craft were sunk or damaged beyond repair. In the nearly seven decades since, fewer than 30 ships have been lost directly due to enemy action or accidents.”
The cost to repair the Bonhomme Richard will be high, coming on the back of its $249 million maintenance availability—perhaps even greater than the $3 billion dollar price tag to replace her with a new America-class LHA. There are many advocates making logical arguments that the extensive damage requires the Bonhomme Richard be decommissioned and struck from the Naval Vessel Register. Indeed, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Gilday has asked, “Should we make that investment in a 22-year-old ship? . . . I’m not going to make any predictions until we take a look at all the facts and we follow the facts and we can make reasonable recommendations up the chain of command on the future steps, any repair efforts, future repair efforts of Bonhomme Richard.” However, even in the current fiscal environment the Navy needs to look beyond the dollar cost as it decides the fate of the Bonhomme Richard.
If the United States goes to war with a peer adversary, some warships will suffer severe combat damage. Consider that it took nearly two years to repair the USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) and USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) following their 2017 collisions. In a fight with China for control of the Pacific, the United States will not have that long to get ships back in the fight. Taking years for repairs could cause the United States to lose the next war not long after the first major naval engagement. As unfortunate as the Bonhomme Richard fire was, the Navy now has an opportunity to relearn repairing severely damaged ships and getting them back into the fight.
“Damage to the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard caused by fires, explosions, and flooding is ‘extensive,” Gilday said in a summary report. “. . .We have not seen a fire of this magnitude on a Navy ship in recent memory, at least in my career.” Sailors and civilian contractors now will be able to develop and capture best practices on repairing catastrophically damaged ships. There will be setbacks—some ideas on how to best repair the ship will not work out, and costs will exceed original estimates, all while well-intentioned civilian bureaucrats and politicians question the Navy’s decision to repair rather than replace the ship. The Navy can overcome the setbacks and minimize the cost overruns while reinforcing a message that this is not just about repairing a damaged ship, it is about relearning the lost art of repairing battle-damaged ships. The nation that masters this first will have an advantage over its adversaries.
Repairing the Bonhomme Richard also will afford the Navy the chance to learn about the ship after it has been returned to service. For this reason, the Navy would be wise to embed civilian representatives from commercial shipyards, Naval Sea Systems Command, and any other commands that can learn from the Bonhomme Richard’s crew at sea following extensive repairs. Even in an ideal world after an extensive yard period, a ship’s systems will not always work as designed. The Bonhomme Richard will likely have numerous issues to resolve after being repaired.
Rather than thinking of the Bonhomme Richard as a badly damaged warship in need of scrapping or repair, she should be thought of as a floating test bed, laboratory, and schoolhouse in how to repair a badly damaged modern warship. Imagine if the Navy had possessed the institutional knowledge in ship repair on 7 December 1941 that it had on 2 September 1945. Having a robust ship-building industrial base ready for the demands of naval warfare is not just about being able to build new ships, it is also about being able to repair ships after they have been damaged in battle. It would be a tremendous mistake to miss this once-in-a-generation opportunity to learn how to do so.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedi ... t-any-cost
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Tue Sep 08, 2020 1:24 pm
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Tue Sep 08, 2020 2:46 pm
https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!top ... suvmP66xrw
Heard a story last week about a Sabre jet being stolen from air show. Tried to find that. Failed, but found this about a mechanic who took off by mistake.
Heard a story last week about a Sabre jet being stolen from air show. Tried to find that. Failed, but found this about a mechanic who took off by mistake.
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Tue Sep 08, 2020 11:25 pm
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Thu Sep 17, 2020 9:55 pm
The Malay Barrier was the site of Grenadier's fourth war patrol from 13 October to 10 December. After laying a minefield off Haiphong, Indochina, the submarine made an unsuccessful attack on a large freighter. During the severe depth charging which followed, sea water seeped into the batteries; Grenadier's crew suffered headaches and nausea from chlorine gas poisoning for the remainder of the patrol. On 12 November, she attacked and sank by torpedo the rescue tug Hokkai Maru (457 GRT) off the coast of Vietnam (11°18'N 109°02'E).[8][9] To increase the misery, on 20 November Grenadier spotted a Ryūjō-class aircraft carrier, escorted by a cruiser and a destroyer, heading through the Strait of Makassar too distant to shoot. Grenadier surfaced to radio the aircraft carrier's location and course to Fremantle submarine base in hope that another submarine could capitalize on it.
Grenadier's fifth war patrol, under the command of LCDR John Allison Fitzgerald, between 1 January and 20 February 1943, brought her considerably better fortune than earlier patrols. A 75-ton schooner fell victim to her deck guns 10 January, and two days later Grenadier sighted a small tanker with a barge in tow. Judging the target not worth a torpedo, she slipped silently into the column behind the two Japanese ships. At dusk she battle surfaced. With binoculars lashed to the deck guns as sights, she raked the tanker and barge, sinking them immediately. The remainder of her patrol, along the Borneo coast through shallow and treacherous waters, was hampered by fathometer failures. She conducted an aggressive attack on two cargo ships 22 January but did not sink them.
The submarine departed Australia on 20 March on her last war patrol and headed for the Strait of Malacca, gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Patrolling along the Malay and Thai coasts, Grenadier claimed a small freighter off the island of Phuket on 6 April. She remained in the area and late in the night of 20 April sighted two merchantmen and closed in for the attack. Running on the surface at dawn 21 April, Grenadier spotted, and was simultaneously spotted by, a Japanese plane. The submarine dived, and as it passed 130 feet (40 m) her executive officer commented, "We ought to be safe now." Just then, explosions rocked Grenadier and heeled her over 15 to 20 degrees. Power and lights failed completely and the fatally wounded ship settled to the bottom at 270 feet (82 m). She tried to make repairs, while a fierce fire blazed in the maneuvering room.[10]
After 13 hours of sweating it out on the bottom Grenadier, managed to surface after dark to clear the boat of smoke and inspect damage. The damage to her propulsion system was irreparable. Attempting to bring his ship closer to shore so that the crew could scuttle her and escape into the jungle, Commander Fitzgerald even tried to jury-rig a sail. But the long night's work proved futile. As dawn broke on 22 April, Grenadier's weary crew sighted two Japanese ships heading for them. The skipper "didn't think it advisable to make a stationary dive in 280 feet of water without power," and the crew began burning confidential documents prior to abandoning ship. A Japanese plane attacked the stricken submarine, but Grenadier, though dead in the water and to all appearances helpless, blazed away with her machine guns. She hit the plane on its second pass. As the damaged plane veered off, its torpedo landed about 200 yards (200 m) from the boat and exploded.
Loss
Opening all vents, the crew of Grenadier abandoned ship and watched her sink to her final resting place. A Japanese merchantman picked up eight officers and 68 enlisted men and took them to Penang, Malay States, where they were questioned, beaten, and starved before being sent to other prison camps. They were then separated and transferred from camp to camp along the Malay Peninsula and finally to Japan. Throughout the war they suffered brutal, inhuman treatment, and their refusal to reveal military information frustrated and angered their captors. First word that any had survived Grenadier reached Australia on 27 November 1943. Despite the brutal and sadistic treatment, all but four of Grenadier's crew survived their two years in Japanese hands.
Grenadier received four battle stars for World War II service.
The sunken wreck of the USS grenadier was found by a team of Australian , French and Belgian divers in 2020.[11]
“Father, when we too are tired, and prepare ourselves to slip beneath the final wave,
Grant that we may let loose the moorings And sink slowly into the deep waters trusting like them, to wake with thee”
Grenadier's fifth war patrol, under the command of LCDR John Allison Fitzgerald, between 1 January and 20 February 1943, brought her considerably better fortune than earlier patrols. A 75-ton schooner fell victim to her deck guns 10 January, and two days later Grenadier sighted a small tanker with a barge in tow. Judging the target not worth a torpedo, she slipped silently into the column behind the two Japanese ships. At dusk she battle surfaced. With binoculars lashed to the deck guns as sights, she raked the tanker and barge, sinking them immediately. The remainder of her patrol, along the Borneo coast through shallow and treacherous waters, was hampered by fathometer failures. She conducted an aggressive attack on two cargo ships 22 January but did not sink them.
The submarine departed Australia on 20 March on her last war patrol and headed for the Strait of Malacca, gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Patrolling along the Malay and Thai coasts, Grenadier claimed a small freighter off the island of Phuket on 6 April. She remained in the area and late in the night of 20 April sighted two merchantmen and closed in for the attack. Running on the surface at dawn 21 April, Grenadier spotted, and was simultaneously spotted by, a Japanese plane. The submarine dived, and as it passed 130 feet (40 m) her executive officer commented, "We ought to be safe now." Just then, explosions rocked Grenadier and heeled her over 15 to 20 degrees. Power and lights failed completely and the fatally wounded ship settled to the bottom at 270 feet (82 m). She tried to make repairs, while a fierce fire blazed in the maneuvering room.[10]
After 13 hours of sweating it out on the bottom Grenadier, managed to surface after dark to clear the boat of smoke and inspect damage. The damage to her propulsion system was irreparable. Attempting to bring his ship closer to shore so that the crew could scuttle her and escape into the jungle, Commander Fitzgerald even tried to jury-rig a sail. But the long night's work proved futile. As dawn broke on 22 April, Grenadier's weary crew sighted two Japanese ships heading for them. The skipper "didn't think it advisable to make a stationary dive in 280 feet of water without power," and the crew began burning confidential documents prior to abandoning ship. A Japanese plane attacked the stricken submarine, but Grenadier, though dead in the water and to all appearances helpless, blazed away with her machine guns. She hit the plane on its second pass. As the damaged plane veered off, its torpedo landed about 200 yards (200 m) from the boat and exploded.
Loss
Opening all vents, the crew of Grenadier abandoned ship and watched her sink to her final resting place. A Japanese merchantman picked up eight officers and 68 enlisted men and took them to Penang, Malay States, where they were questioned, beaten, and starved before being sent to other prison camps. They were then separated and transferred from camp to camp along the Malay Peninsula and finally to Japan. Throughout the war they suffered brutal, inhuman treatment, and their refusal to reveal military information frustrated and angered their captors. First word that any had survived Grenadier reached Australia on 27 November 1943. Despite the brutal and sadistic treatment, all but four of Grenadier's crew survived their two years in Japanese hands.
Grenadier received four battle stars for World War II service.
The sunken wreck of the USS grenadier was found by a team of Australian , French and Belgian divers in 2020.[11]
“Father, when we too are tired, and prepare ourselves to slip beneath the final wave,
Grant that we may let loose the moorings And sink slowly into the deep waters trusting like them, to wake with thee”
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Sat Sep 19, 2020 9:01 am
The Air Force Secretly Designed, Built, and Flew a Brand-New Fighter Jet
https://www.popularmechanics.com/milita ... ghter-jet/
https://www.popularmechanics.com/milita ... ghter-jet/
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Sat Sep 19, 2020 11:17 am
That's....pretty fucking amazing
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Sat Sep 19, 2020 12:09 pm
State Dept. wishes Air Force happy birthday, uses image of Navy’s Blue Angels
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Sat Sep 19, 2020 2:26 pm
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Sat Sep 19, 2020 3:48 pm
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Mon Sep 21, 2020 5:07 pm
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Mon Sep 21, 2020 5:13 pm
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Mon Sep 21, 2020 5:19 pm
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Wed Sep 23, 2020 6:50 pm
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Wed Sep 23, 2020 6:56 pm
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Wed Sep 23, 2020 7:03 pm
Fuccckk!!! I'm a dead man I totally didn't see him. In my defense I am looking at this on a 6.9-in phone screen
Re: CQ's Military thread
Posted: Wed Sep 23, 2020 7:21 pm
Damn, I definitely missed the 3rd guy.